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Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring
Theories
MARGARET F. BRINIG & F.H. BUCKLEY*

INTRODUCTION

Like everything else in divorce, custody often seems a zero-sum game in which
one spouse wins and the other loses. Time enjoyed with children, which used to
be shared, must now be divided. Traditionally, the division was a very sharp one,
with one parent awarded sole custody and the other restricted to circumscribed
visitation rights. More recently, however, joint-custody awards have become
more common. Under joint custody, parents share access to children and childrearing responsibilities.
Proponents ofjoint custody argue that it eases the pain of divorce for children.
For the child, sole custody may seem like the death of the noncustodial parent,
and in many respects it is just that. The child will lose his guidance and
emotional support, and not infrequently his financial support as well. Joint
custody, though by no means as beneficial for the child as a continued marriage,
eases these burdens, and better prepares the child for life as an adult.
This Article discusses two possible benefits ofjoint custody. Under bonding
theories, fathers permit themselves to grow more attached to children when they
do not fear a complete break with them on divorce. With the increased emotional
ties, divorce becomes less likely. This greatly benefits children, as divorce is one
of the greatest tragedies which can befall them.
Under monitoring theories, joint custody addresses an agency-cost problem
that arises under sole custody. The noncustodial parent cannot easily see how his
financial contributions are spent, and therefore assumes the risk that some
moneys will be misspent. With joint custody, by contrast, the parent can monitor
for such problems through his increased access and responsibility.,
We tested bonding and monitoring theories ofjoint custody through regression
analysis. We first regressed divorce levels on joint custody and socioeconomic
predictors, and found that joint-custody laws are significantly correlated with
lower divorce rates, as predicted by bonding theories. We then regressed childsupport-payment ratios on legal and socioeconomic predictors, and found that
joint-custody laws are significantly correlated with higher child-support ratios,
as predicted by monitoring theories. These results are robust under various
estimation techniques and different independent variables.

* We gratefully acknowledge the support of the George Mason University School of Law,
and comments by Jana B. Singer and participants at a symposium on Law and the New
American Family, held on April 4, 1997 at the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
Address: George Mason University School of Law, 3401 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington,
Virginia 22201. Phone: (703) 993-8022 (8028). Internet: mbrinig@vmsl.gmu.edu,
fbuckley@osfl.gmu.edu.
I. In our choice of pronouns, we refer to the noncustodial parent as a man and the
custodial parent as a woman.
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We do not suggest that our findings are dispositive. More research is needed
on the relation between joint-custody laws, child support, and divorce. In
addition, the reduction in divorce levels may not be benign if wives stay in
abusive relationships lest they lose partial custody of their children under joint
custody. This too suggests an agenda for further empirical research.
Part I of the Article describes the evolution of custody law, and the recent
move to joint custody. Part II discusses criticisms of joint custody, and Part III
offers a bonding and monitoring defense of it. Our empirical tests are described
in Part IV, and we conclude in Part V.
I. THE LAW OF JOINT CUSTODY
2
On divorce, child custody has traditionally been granted to one parent only.

Who that parent might be changed over time. Before the nineteenth century,
custody was usually awarded to the father, even when he had committed the
marital fault? This changed in nineteenth-century America, and courts began to
award custody to the mother when the father was at fault, on the theory that the
children would be "best taken care of and instructed by the innocent party."4 In
most cases, this meant that custody was awarded to mothers. No-fault divorces
were not then available, and divorcing fathers usually admitted fault to procure
the divorce.
In this century, custody was awarded to mothers for a further reason, as the
focus shifted from parental fault to the interests of the child. A "child of tender
years" would need a mother more than a father. When the child was very young,
therefore, mothers were usually granted custody, to permit the child to receive
"such care, love, and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can...
give."' In time, divorce laws were amended
to provide that custody should turn
'6
on "the best interests of the child."

2. See PRINCIPLES-OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.09 reporter's notes to cmt. f,
at 153 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996). For example, "where one parent is awarded general
custody, the ordinary and accepted procedure is for the court, in deference to the natural rights
of the unsuccessful parent, to include in the decree a provision permitting the parent deprived
of custody to have privileges of visitation." Griffin v, Griffin, 75 S.E.2d 133, 138 (N.C. 1953);
see also Wilkins v. Wilkins, 120 N.W. 907, 908 (Neb. 1909). Modem statutes with such rules
include 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(a) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(a)
(Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320(1) (Michie Supp. 1995); LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 136A (West 1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
3. For an illuminating discussion of historical trends in custody adjudication, see Robert
H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication:JudicialFunctionsin the Face ofIndeterminacy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 234.
4. JOEL BISHOP, COMMENTARmS ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE 520 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1852); see also Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307, 337 (1878).
5. Ullman v. Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (App. Div. 1912); see also Moore v. Moore,
183 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1971); J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
6. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1)(b)1.
(West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2) (Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(b)
(Supp. 1996). The American Law Institute, wishing to do away with a terminology that treated
the child as the parent's possession, refers instead to "residential responsibility." PRINCIPLES
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While the "best interests" standard at first resulted in a presumption of
maternal custody, it later came to mean something very different. Courts came
to aim directly at the best interests of the child, without applying any
presumptions about which parent should get custody. The presumption of
maternal custody was seen as antiquated, and most state divorce laws were
amended to remove it and make custody gender neutral! A minority of states
have since moved to a primary-caretaker rule, which awards custody to the parent
who had the primary responsibility for the child during the marriage.8
At the same time, other family-law changes advantaged erring husbands. In
Orr v. Orr9 the Supreme Court held that sex-based custody preferences in
alimony were unconstitutional.'0 Alimony came to be seen as a temporary relief
measure for divorced wives who would soon become self-sufficient as well."
Divorcing husbands were further advantaged by no-fault divorce laws, which
dispensed with fault requirements on divorce. In a fault regime, the party seeking
a divorce (often the husband) must offer a side payment to his spouse if he was
at fault. Because fault is penalized in this way, there will be less of it, and fewer
divorces than under no-fault. 2
The move to joint custody, which has become much more common in the last
twenty years,' 3 has also been seen to advantage husbands. Currently, courts in
virtually all states are authorized to consider joint-custody arrangements, 4 and

OF THELAw OF FAMILY DIssOLUTION § 2.09 cmt. a, at 106; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 14-10-123.4 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(l)(A) (West Supp. 19961997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5312 (West 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a)
(West 1996).

7. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2
(Michie Supp. 1997).

8. See, e.g., Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d
152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
9. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
10. See id at 269; see also Exparte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); State ex rel. Watts
v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
11. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriageand Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STuD. 869, 877-78 & n.47 (1994).
12. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws andAt-Fault People, 5 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1998).
13. For a relatively early (and frequently cited) award ofjoint custody, see Beck v. Beck,
432 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1981). For a very early award ofjoint custody, see Mullen v. Mullen, 49
S.E.2d 349, 356 (Va. 1948).
14. For a tally as of summer 1996, see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSoLuTION §
2.09 reporter's notes to cmt. f, at 153-55 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996). See also the yearly
summary of Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Children'sIssues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 769 tbl.2, 771 (1996). For a typical
statute, see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(d) (Supp. 1997): "It is the express policy of this state to
encourage that a minor child has continuing contact with his parents... who have shown the
ability to act in the best interest of the child and to encourage parents to share in the rights and
responsibilities of raising their children .
I...
Id. Section 19-9-3(a)(5) provides that joint
custody may be considered as an alternative form of custody by the court. See id. § 19-93(a)(5).
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nearly a quarter presume that this will be in the child's best interests.' 5 Since
wives were more likely to be granted sole custody under the primary-caretaker
rule, the move to joint custody means that husbands (wives) on average see more
(less) of their children after divorce.
Joint custody means more than a sharing of physical custody, as parents must
share the responsibility for the child's upbringing. 6 Both parents are to be
consulted on major decisions, and each might veto the other's decisions. This
contemplates a cooperative relationship after divorce and also means that a
husband who pays child support can better see how his money is spent under
joint custody.
TABLE I.

STATE JOINT-CUSTODY LAWS

Year of Enactment of Joint-Custody Statutes, or Adoption by Case.
States which had not enacted such laws by 1993 are denoted by a 0.

State Name

JOINT
CUSTODY

Alabama

0

Kansas

1979

Kentucky

1979

Louisiana

1981

Alaska

1982

Maine

1981

Arizona

1991

Maryland

1984

Arkansas

0

Massachusetts

1983

California

1979

Michigan

1981

Colorado

1983

Minnesota

1981

Connecticut

1981

Mississippi

1983

Delaware

1981

Missouri

1983

Florida

1979

Montana

1981

Georgia

1990

Nebraska

1983

Hawaii

1980

Nevada

1981

Idaho

1982

New Hampshire

1974

Illinois

1986

New Jersey

1981

Indiana

1973

New Mexico

1982

Iowa

1977

New York

1981

15. See, e.g.,

FLA. STAT. ANN.

appears in PRINCIPLES

§ 61.13(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The list, with variations,

OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION

§ 2.09 reporter's notes to cmt f,

at 154-55 (reporting that five states presume joint custody when the parties agree, while six
allow the presumption to be overcome by a preponderance of evidence in favor of an
alternative award when this is in the child's best interests).
16. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20107.2 (Michie Supp. 1997).
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North Carolina

1979

North Dakota

1993

Ohio

1981

Oklahoma

1990

Oregon

1987

Pennsylvania

1981

Rhode Island

1992

South Carolina

0

South Dakota

1989

Tennessee

1986

Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1987
1988
1992
1987
0
0
1979
1993

Table I lists the states which promote joint custody, and the year in which such
laws were adopted. When a state mentions joint custody as an option, we deem
it to be ajoint-custody state, since courts in all such states appear ready to grant
joint custody. 7 Where the statute does not refer to joint custody as an option, but
reported cases support such awards, we also list the state under the joint-custody
column. On this definition, virtually all states are joint-custody states today, but
many were not during the earlier period of our study.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF JOINT CUSTODY

This Part considers three objections to joint custody. First, it is said to harm
children because custody might be shared with unfit fathers. Second, joint
custody is said to effect a wealth transfer from women, who will trade off assets
for increased access to their children. Third, the move to joint custody might
have no effect on actual custody arrangements when the parties bargain around
the legal rule.
These objections raise empirical issues which are beyond the scope of this
paper. As such, we cannot assert that the move to joint custody is necessarily
benign. However, some of the objections seem less than compelling to us, while
the advantages to joint custody which we discuss in the next Part seem somewhat
persuasive.
A. The Efficacy ofJudicialScreening

Some feminists argue that joint custody ill-serves children. In the move from
maternal custody, it is said, fathers who really did not want to raise their child
have been awarded joint custody.' The move to joint custody has also been seen

17. This would include joint legal custody or joint physical custody. For definitions, see
infra note 34.
18. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, DominantDiscourse,ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking,101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 761 (1988); Trina Grillo,
The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1594-96 (1991);
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as unfair to women. In the stress on the child's well-being, the mother's
contributions during marriage are devalued. The father's newfound interest in
child rearing is heralded and welcomed, while the more faithful mother's
longtime contributions are ignored. 9 More radical feminists see joint custody as
a tool to control former wives." The debate is often highly politicized, and joint
custody is indeed strongly supported by a fathers' rights movement. 2 '
No one would want to award joint custody to an unfit parent, and there is
evidence that children whose parents have been involved in violent conflicts may
fare better on divorce.2 2 Courts in joint-custody states are therefore enjoined to
award sole custody to the fit parent in such cases. 23 To the extent that this
objection is telling, it raises a concern about the efficacy of judicial screening.
If courts can always spot the unfit parent, the problem does not arise. But of
course judicial screening is never perfect, and in some cases a joint-custody
award might not be in the child's best interests. As well, the fear of such an
award might deter a risk-averse wife from leaving an abusive relationship.24
During marriage she can monitor her husband's behavior to the child; after
divorce she cannot do so as easily unless she has sole custody.

Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, RethinkingJointCustody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 478 (1984).
19. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor ParentalEquality,

38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991); Grillo, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Fineman, supranote 18; Mary Ann Mason, Motherhoodv. Equal Treatment,
29 J. FAM. L. 1, 26-27 (1990-91); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism, The
MaternalPresumption Revisited, I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1970).
21. See Robert E. Fay, The DisenfranchisedFather,36 ADVANCED PEDIATRICS 407 (1989);
Jerry W. McCant, The CulturalContradictionof Fathersas Nonparents,21 FAM. L.Q. 127

(1987). For a more moderate approach that proposes the replication of intact family patterns,
see John S. Murray, Improving Parentand Child Relationships Within the DivorcedFamily:

A Callfor Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 563 (1986). For a popular account of a
father's rights movement, see Stephanie B. Goldberg, In All Its Variations,the Fathers'Rights
Movement Is Saying One Thing-Make Way for Daddy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 48.
22. See Alan Booth & John N. Edwards, Transmission ofMaritalandFamily Quality over
the Generations: The Effect of ParentalDivorce and Unhappiness, 13 J. DIVORCE 41, 55

(1989).
23. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.13, at 193-209 (Preliminary

Draft No. 6, 1996); e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(8) (Michie 1995). "The trial judge is
required to consider '[a]ny history of family abuse as ... defined in § 16.1-228' when
determining custody of minor children." Davenport v. Davenport, No. 1517-93-2, 1995 WL
40245, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995) (alteration and omission in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(8)).
24. Concerns about marital violence lurk behind the critique of "staying together for the
sake of the child." Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "Forthe Sake of the Children":A
FeministReply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1435 (1992); see also Linda R. Keenan,
Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 407,426 (1985). See generally MARTHA L. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 119-26
(1991); D. Marianne Brower Blair, Parent-InitiatedTermination of ParentalRights: The
Ultimate Weapon in Matrimonial Warfare, 24 TULSA L.J. 299, 343-50 (1989) (criticizing

Judith Wallerstein's studies).
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These concerns suggest a useful empirical agenda.25 However, it is wrong to
conclude that screening problems occur only under joint custody. Courts may
also err under sole custody, and award exclusive custody to an unfit parent.
There is indeed little reason to think that these problems are more severe under
joint than sole custody. We might fear a grant of joint custody to unfit fathers if
male family-law judges, under the grip of a humanist ideology, systematically
favored men. But can anyone seriously think that this describes family-law courts
in America? Moreover, given the better monitoring available through shared
custody, joint custody's self-correcting tendencies are plausibly stronger than
those of sole custody.
B. Wealth-TransferEffects
The rise of joint custody may also disadvantage women in their property
negotiations.26 On divorce, the parties might trade off property for custody.27
Under a sole maternal-custody default rule, for example, a devoted father might
offer a greater share of his property for increased access to his child. Alternately,
under joint custody, a wife might trade off property for sole custody, if she
values sole custody more highly than her spouse values joint custody. Even if
both regimes are valued equally, the change from a maternal-custody regime to
joint custody might advantage men if women are systematically more risk averse
than men.28 Joint custody has also been said to harm women who participate in
divorce mediation. Given the option of joint custody, mediation encourages
women to sacrifice the economic leverage a sole-custody regime gives them.29
Even if wealth-transfer effects are anticipated, however, they would seem
better addressed through stronger property entitlements, assuming that jointcustody rules are otherwise benign. On a move to joint custody, wives might be
offered a greater share of the matrimonial assets if the couple has a child. Wives
might further be advantaged in property negotiations if no-fault laws are relaxed
and property and support duties are made to depend on marital fault, as we have
elsewhere proposed."0

25. We are at present attempting to conduct such a test, though data-limitation problems
are substantial.
26. See Martha L. Fineman, The Politicsof Custody and the TransformationofAmerican
Custody DecisionMaking, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 829 (1989); Nancy D. Polikoff, Gender and
Child Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 183, 187-92 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983).
27. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALEL.J. 950, 963-66 (1979).
28. For evidence of differential risk aversion in custody decisions, see Margaret F. Brinig,
Does MediationDisadvantageWomen?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995).
29. See Grillo, supra note 18.
30. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 12.
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C. CoasianIrrelevance
Custody laws might be trivial, in the sense that they do not determine who
raises the child. This is just what the Coase Theorem would predict: Legal rules
do not affect outcomes when the parties can bargain around the rules.' If so, the
move to' joint custody might have wealth-transfer effects, but will not affect
actual custody arrangements. The child will always end up with the parent who
values him most.
Whether joint-custody laws are Coasian is an empirical question. There is some
evidence that couples awarded joint custody settle into custody patterns not
unlike those under sole custody.32 However, the empirical issue is by no means
settled. Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the Coasian critique might fail in
several ways. First, even parents of ordinary delicacy might be unwilling to treat
their children as fungible with money in bargaining over custody. One reason for
this is that the willingness to "sell" one's child might be taken as a signal of
parental unfitness.
Second, even if parents do bargain over custody, it is not clear that such
bargains would be enforced by courts. For example, the bargain's signal of
parental unfitness might be taken by a court as a reason to deny custody.
Moreover, some courts in sole-custody regimes simply frown on joint custody,
even if the parents appear to have agreed to it.33 As well, private joint-custody
agreements would contain terms which courts would not enforce. Fathers seek
more than time with their children. They also seek the recognition that they have
an important role to play after divorce, and a continued right to influence their
children's lives.34 Unlike fathers with mere visitation rights, joint-custody fathers

31. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. &EcON., Oct. 1960, at 1.
32. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKrN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 113-14,225
(1992); Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 167 (1990); Judith A. Seltzer, Legal Custody Arrangements and Children'sEconomic
Welfare, 96 Am. J. Soc. 895, 900 (1991) [hereinafter Seltzer, Legal Custody] (reporting few
differences in physical-custody arrangements, but lower child-support payments by
noncustodial fathers).
Whatever the custody award, in practice one parent, usually the mother, will have primary
physical custody. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra; Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V.
Alexeev, Tradingat Divorce: Preferences,Legal Rules and TransactionCosts, 8 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsp. RESOL. 279 (1993); Judith A. Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Dissolutionfor

Children, 20 ANN. REv. Soc. 235 (1994) [hereinafter Seltzer, Consequences].
33. For a recent example, see Woodall v. Woodall, 471 S.E.2d 154, 156-58 (S.C. 1996).
34. See, for example, section 20-124.1 of the Virginia Code for the definition of joint
custody in its legal and physical manifestations.
"Joint custody" means (i) joint legal custody where both parents retain joint
responsibility for the care and control of the child and joint authority to make
decisions concerning the child even though the child's primary residence may be
with only one parent, (ii)joint physical custody where both parents share physical
and custodial care of the child or (iii) any combination of joint legal and joint
physical custody which the court deems to be in the best interest of the child.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (emphasis in original); see also MACCOBY
& MNOOKIN, supra note 32, at 289.
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must be consulted in all important decisions involving their children. They have
access to medical and school records, and are entitled to attend school
conferences and all other major events in their children's lives. These privileges
follow from the status of joint custody, and cannot be purchased in an
enforceable bargain.
Third, attitudes to children might in part be shaped by the legal regime, as a
consequence of the custody award's wealth-transfer effects. The claim that
custody laws are trivial assumes that preferences for children are exogenous, and
unaffected by the custody regime. But preferences might be endogenous, and
partly determined by the award of custody.
This might happen when the mother's willingness to pay for sole custody in a
joint-custody regime is less than what she would accept in agreeing to joint
custody in a sole-custody regime? 5 Suppose that (1) the mother's initial
endowment of assets is $10,000 and her access to credit is constrained, (2) under
sole maternal custody, she would not agree to share custody for less than
$50,000, and (3) the father places a value of $20,000 on joint custody. Under
sole custody, the parties will fail to reach an agreement, since the mother values
sole custody more than the father values joint custody. Thus the child will remain
under the mother's sole care. The parties will also fail to reach an agreement
under joint custody, since the father will not surrender joint custody for less than
$20,000, while the mother cannot raise more than $10,000 for sole custody. The
award ofjoint custody will then remain undisturbed, and Coasian irrelevance will
fail to hold.36
Seeing more of their children under joint custody, the fathers might feel greater
affection for them, and be more willing to spend time with them. By contrast, the
noncustodial father not infrequently loses interest in the child." Noncustodial
fathers often disengage from their children after divorce, and instead devote
themselves to new children acquired through cohabitation or remarriage.3 8
The change in the legal regime might have affected bargaining behavior in
another way. When joint custody was uncommon, fathers did not seek custody,
and women were regarded as poor mothers if they did not do so.39 The change in
social norms has increased the demand by fathers for joint custody, and may in
part have resulted from a change in legal norms. Changes in legal rules have been

35. See generally Don L. Coursey et al., The DisparityBetween Willingness to Accept and
Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, 102 Q.J. EcoN. 679 (1989); W. Michael Hanemann,
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON.
REv. 635 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1325 (1990).
36. Or will hold under the caveat that endowment or income effects are ignored. See
Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972). Our
Appendix models the welfare effects of a shift from sole to joint custody.
1 37. See Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective-Goods in Divorce
Settlements, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 268, 288 (1985).
38. See Seltzer, Consequences,supra note 32, at 260.
39. A married mother one of us knows says she still "can't help" trying to spend more time
than her husband does with the kids. She feels like a "bad morn" otherwise. The distinctions
are explored at length in Czapanskiy, supra note 19.
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said to affect social norms in such matters as racial discrimination and seat
belts,4" and may also have changed parenting norms.
III. THE DEFENSE OF JOINT CUSTODY
This Part describes how joint custody might benefit children. If the move to
joint custody does affect actual custodial arrangements, children might benefit
both before and after divorce. Before divorce, the prospect ofjoint custody might
reduce a father's fear that he will lose access to his child. He might therefore
invest more emotion in his child, and increased paternal bonding may reduce the
possibility of divorce. After divorce, fathers might provide better emotional and
financial support for their children when custody is shared. Even if a move to a
joint-custody regime does not affect actual custodial arrangements, it gives
noncustodial parents a greater ability to monitor how their child-support
payments are spent. Monitoring theories therefore predict increased child-support
levels under joint custody.
We test bonding and monitoring theories ofjoint custody in Part IV.
A. Benefits Before Divorce: Bonding Theories
When divorce is not a final separation, fathers may permit themselves to bond
more closely with their children. In bonding more closely with their children,
they will also bond more closely to their wives, since family affections are not
contained in watertight compartments. Fathers might also feel more willing to
bond more closely to their wives during marriage when they anticipate continued
ties through joint custody after divorce.
For economists, bonding (or "hands-tying") strategies are devices which a
bargainer employs to signal that he will perform his promises, when they cannot
be legally enforced or when legal enforceability offers inadequate incentives to
perform.4 To persuade the promisee of his intention to perform, the promisor
might bind himself to do so by undertaking to incur a cost on breach. For
example, a medieval prince might seal his treaty by sending his son to live with
his cocontractor. This would greatly increase the penalty for breach, and would
permit the cocontractor to rely more on the prince's promise. Absent the bonding
strategy, no one might rely on a promise, and the benefits of bargaining might be
lost.
As in international law, legal sanctions in family law may inadequately
constrain promise breakers. Divorce rights cannot be waived, with the result that
the parties will walk into marriage with fewer expectations today than they had
100 years ago. Given the relaxation of legal enforcement, the parties might
substitute bonding devices to signal their credibility. For example, the custom of
giving a ring on an engagement can be seen as a bonding device, and ring-giving

40. See Cass R. Sunstein, SocialNorms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
41. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 37-47 (rev. ed. 1984) (defining
bonding strategies' relation to imperfect rationality); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
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appears to have increased after the common law action for breach-of-promise
was abolished.42 Apart from a willingness to hazard material assets, a promisor
might bind himself by undertaking to bear emotional distress on breach.43 As
A.E. Housman noted, giving one's heart away is a risky strategy." However, the
economist (if not the poet) might consider this a useful bonding device, if it
reliably signals the promisor's credibility.
This assumes that the decision to bear emotional distress may be deliberate.
The question how our reason might command our passions is an old one, much
beloved of dualists, and a famous answer was given by Pascal. How is it, he
asked, that one can come to believe in the Catholic faith, even if reason tells us
that such a belief is reasonable? The knowledge that it is rational to believe does
not produce belief, any more than the knowledge that it is rational to love
produces love. Only custom and sentiment, and not rational argument, can
persuade. Nevertheless, an internal reason can tell us how to harness external
custom to effect a change in sentiments. "llfaut que 1'extdrieur soitjoint a
l'intirieurpour obtenir de Dieu; c'est-&-dire que l'on se mette a genoux, prie
des lavres, etc., afin que l'homme orgueilleux qui n 'a voulu se soumettre 'i Dieu
4
soit maintenantsoumis a la crdature.""
So too, reason may tell a father to bond
more closely with his children when the probability of a cut-off of custody rights
is reduced. He might then spend more time with his children, knowing that this,
like kneeling and praying aloud, will change his sentiments. Shaping one's
passions in this way is not irrational, but is instead an example of how "fill n'y
a rien de si conforme a la raison que ce ddsaveu de la raison.'' "
Pascal's claim that reason may control the passions might offend the Romantic,
who believes that one cannot choose to give one's heart away. But who of the
two is right is an empirical objection, and the evidence more clearly supports
Pascal than the Romantic. For example, the move to no-fault divorce laws
plausibly increased the probability of divorce,47 and is significantly correlated
with lower marriage rates.4" If we are a less romantic society today, then in part
the blame may be laid at the door of divorce liberalization.
We therefore hypothesize that a move to joint custody will decrease divorce
rates. Fathers will react to the change in the law by permitting themselves,
through a thousand quotidian acts, to grow more attached to their families. And
as a consequence, they will find themselves less ready to leave them.
Reducing divorce rates would almost certainly be in the best interests of
children. Thirty years ago, before the run-up in divorce rates, liberationist

42. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises,6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 203 (1990).
43. See Robert H. Frank, IfiHomo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function,
Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 593 (1987).
44. See A.E. HoUsMAN, A SHROPSHIRE LAD 9-10 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., Dover
Publications, Inc. 1990) (1896).
45. BLAISE PASCAL, PENstEs 944 250 115 (Hubert Carrier ed., Nouveaux Classiques
illustrds Hachette 1976) (1669); see also DAVID HUME, Of Polygamy and Divorces, in EssAys,
MORAL, POLmCAL, AND LITERARY 181 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1987) (1742).
46. PASCAL, supra note 45, at 182 272 43.
47. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 12.
48. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 11, at 884-85.
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philosophers, both male and female, argued that divorce did not harm children.
Indeed, they argued, children might be better off after divorce if the parents have
been fighting. But very few people, ideologues apart, still believe that increased
divorce levels are benign. Children are surprisingly resilient in getting over
parental fights.49 What children do not get over is divorce.
A great deal of research suggests that divorce harms children."0 The least
controversial way in which children are harmed is financially. Children of
divorce make up a very large proportion of those below the poverty level s" and
52
historically have received the majority share of public-assistance payments.
Even on conservative estimates, custodial parents (mostly women) and their
children suffer a decline in living standards while noncustodial parents (mostly
men) do better after divorce. 3 Quite apart from these wealth transfers, one would
expect children to suffer financially on divorce. After separation, the parties
must maintain two households, eliminating economies of scale that were present
during the marriage. 4 Finally, decades of federal intervention have not
ameliorated the child-support enforcement-problem5 5 Nor can visitation rights
be tied to child support.56

49. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, RationalDecisionmakingAbout MarriageandDivorce,
76 VA. L. REV. 9, 29-38 (1990), and sources cited therein.
50. A popular account can be found in BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE (1997), reprising her earlier article, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was
Right, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47. For summaries of the literature by social scientists, see E.
Mavis Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce andRemarriageon the Adjustment
of Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 518 (1985); Judith S. Wallerstein, The LongTerm Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 349 (1991); see also David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (suggesting new standards for
resolving custody disputes); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPreference, and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992) (arguing that future custody arrangements should focus
on the child's past relationship with the parent).
51. See, e.g., IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN 12-14 (1986); Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Single Mothers, the
Underclass, and Social Policy, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 98-99 (1989)
(reporting that 18% of single mothers in 1987 had been dependent on welfare for 10 or more
years and 24% of their daughters will be dependent on welfare).
52. See June Carbone, Income Sharing:Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31
Hous. L. REV. 359 (1994). See generally McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 51.
53. See generally Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsiderationof the Economic
Consequences of MaritalDissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485 (1985) (discussing the impact of
divorce and separation on the economic status of men and women using longitudinal data);
Richard A. Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC.
REv. 528 (1996) (arguing that the decrease in the standard of living for women after divorce
is 47% and the increase in the standard of living for men after divorce is 10%).
54. See Weiss & Willis, supranote 37, at 269; see also VICTOR R. FUCHS, How WE LIVE
73 (1983).
55. See David L. Chambers, Fathers,the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perilsof
Child-SupportEnforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575 (1995).
56. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.22 cmt. d, at 369 (Preliminary
Draft No. 6, 1996), and sources cited in id. § 2.22 reporter's notes to cmt. d, at 375; see also
Czapanskiy, supra note 19.
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Children also lose out through their distance from their parents. After
separation, of course, the noncustodial parent will see far less of his children.
What is not well realized is that this may be true of the custodial spouse as well,
if she must find ajob outside the home. 7 The custody arrangement simply cannot
mirror the predivorce sharing of rewards and responsibilities.
Children of divorced parents lose more than financial resources." Most no
longer have two parents who are actively involved in raising them. 9 The children
(particularly if young) may blame themselves for the divorce' If the parents
continue to squabble over visitation and finances or who caused the marital
dissolution, the children necessarily witness a pathological adult relationship.
Even if the separation is peaceful, the custodial parent may be so overwhelmed
by the heavy demands of full-time employment and single parenthood that there
is simply little energy left for the children. Discipline may be neglected, and the
children left largely to their own emotional and intellectual resources. 6' The
picture becomes decidedly more complicated if either parent begins a new adult

57. See, e.g., Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Alaska 1979); In re Marriage of
Arcante, 632 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273
(Iowa 1995); Olive v. Olive, No. 91CA005200, 1992 WL 139997 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17,
1992). See generally Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the
PrimaryCaretakerStandard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 313-15

(1992) (discussing parental fitness after divorce and the primary-caretaker standard in
Minnesota).
58. Perhaps the most cited collection of studies is Scott, supranote 49, at 29-32. For a case
noting the growing literature on divorce pathologies, see Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 386
(Alaska 1977).
59. According to one survey of children living with mothers, 35.5% of the custodians
reported that their children had not seen their fathers in a year; only 16.4% saw their fathers
as often as once a week. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Life Course of Children of
Divorce: MaritalDisruptionand ParentalContact, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 656, 663 (1983).
60. See generallyROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT

(1989) (discussing the effects of divorce on children).
61. Hetherington and others have found that custodial mothers were less communicative
and affectionate with their children and more inconsistent and less effective in setting limits
than were mothers in intact families. Custodial mothers particularly had problems dealing with
their sons. See E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parentsand Children, in

FAM]LES 233, 252 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982). The parenting by custodial
mothers had improved by two years after the divorce. See id. at 251-60. Six years after divorce,
mothers continued to be less effective in disciplining sons, but were as affectionate as mothers
in intact families. See Hetherington et al., supranote 50, at 527. Emery describes other research
findings on deterioration in parenting. Some parents become "overly permissive, rigid or
emotionally dependent" on their children although, after a period of adjustment, most parents
improve in their functioning. EMERY, supra note 60, at 83. Some long-term disruptions were
observed, particularly among mothers who were depressed, who were isolated from relatives
and friends, who had experienced severe economic concerns, or who had several young
NONTRADITIONAL

children. See id at 81-86. See generallyRobert E. Emery et al., Divorce, ChildrenandSocial
Policy, in CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY 189, 210-17 (Harold W.

Stevenson & Albert E. Siegel eds., 1984) (discussing the difficulties experienced by parents
and children in adjusting to their new roles, as well as the inconsistent levels of affection and
discipline resulting from these new situations).
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relationship: the children may feel (or even be) rejected for the new romance or
a new half-sibling.
The costs of divorce for children have been studied in longitudinal
comparisons between children of intact families and those of divorced parents.
Short-term studies report that children are confused and depressed, sometimes
clinically so.62 They fare worse in school,63 have problems in their peer
relationships, and are more apt to "act out."' Over the longer term, researchers
report that the children of divorce are more likely to drop out of school.65 Girls,
especially, are more likely to be promiscuous." Boys are more likely to become
delinquents or criminals.6' Both sexes have a higher rate of marital failure when
they grow up.68

62. Children of divorce are disproportionately represented in outpatient mental-healthclinic populations. See Neil Kalter, Children of Divorce in an Outpatient Psychiatric
Population,47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCIATRY 40 (1977).
63. See M. Anne Hill & June O'Neill, Family Endowments and the Achievement of Young
Childrenwith Special Reference to the Underclass,29 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 1064, 1085-86

(1994) (finding that growing up with a divorced parent has a significant, negative effect on
children's test scores that disappears when family income is taken into account).
64. In one of the most respected longitudinal studies, E. Mavis Hetherington and others
at the University of Virginia studied 72 preschoolers (half girls and half boys) who were
followed and evaluated for two years after divorce. See Hetherington et al., supranote 61, at
233. This group was compared to a control group of children in intact families. Children in
divorced families were found to function worse on a number of psychological tests than those
in intact families at two months and one year. However, they had improved substantially by two
years after divorce. Girls behaved in a more compliant way than did boys. See id. Six years
later, boys in divorced families continued to be less compliant than boys in intact families. See
Hetherington et al., supranote 50, at 527. In another study, Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly
found that children in California improved 18 months after divorce, but, like the Hetherington
study, found that boys were more likely to have continuing problems than girls. See JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 161-67 (1980).
65. Men raised in single-parent households had almost a year less education than those
raised in intact families. See DAVID L. FEATHERMAN & ROBERT M. HAUSER, OPPORTUNITY AND
CHANGE 234-46 (1978). Differences in intellectual performance increase as children grow
older. See Hetherington et al., supranote 61, at 272.
66. See E. Mavis Hetherington, Effects of FatherAbsence on PersonalityDevelopment in
Adolescent Daughters,7 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 313 (1972).
67. See J.W.B. Douglas, Broken Families and ChildBehavior, 4 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS
203, 208-10 (1970). See generally Robert E. Anderson, Where's Dad?PaternalDeprivation
and Delinquency, 18 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 641 (1968) (reporting that significant
numbers of boys in juvenile institutions had experienced separation from their fathers). As

Emery wrote, "divorce has consistently been found to be associated with externalizing
problems among children. There is little need to review the research that substantiates this
conclusion in detail because the association has been so well documented." EMERY, supra note
60, at 52. Emery cites numerous studies that indicate that children of divorce evidence more
aggressive and delinquent behavior than children in intact families. Among these is
Hetherington et al., supra note 61, at 267-72.
68. Judith Wallerstein conducted a 10-year follow-up study in which she found long-term
effects for some children. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 233-35, 237-39 (1989).
In contrast to the findings immediately after separation, children who were older at the time of
divorce experienced more continuing anger and sadness 10 years later than younger children.
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Joint custody might also result in better child rearing. If parents expect that
divorce is possible, and that sole custody will be awarded to the parent to whom
the child is closest, they have an incentive to cut out the other parent in a struggle
for the child's affections, and turn the family into an Oedipal battlefield. Thus
the move to joint custody might reduce parental possessiveness and selfcenteredness in child rearing.69
There would be a strong reason to promote joint custody if it significantly
reduced divorce levels in the manner predicted by bonding theories. However,
joint custody might actually result in increased divorce rates under incentive
theories. To the extent that joint custody renders divorce less fearful, a spouse
who would otherwise be noncustodial has more incentive to commit the
matrimonial faults which lead to divorce. There is no reason a priori to believe
that one theory better than another predicts divorce levels. They must therefore
be tested empirically, as we do in Part IV.
B. Benefits After Divorce: Emotional and Financial
Support

If children spend more time with their fathers under joint custody, this may
benefit them in other ways. In general, two parents are better than one.70 Fathers
will see their children as part of their normal life, and may dispense with the
joyless search for "quality time" with them on weekends or vacations. 7, The
parents will be better able to perform their complementary roles, 72 and to balance
each other's power. 73 They may also more easily serve as exemplars whom the
children may emulate as they mature.74
Joint custody also formalizes a more normal bond between ex-spouses. The
rancor of a divorce may be less bitterly felt and remembered when one knows
that a common tie will remain and cannot be ignored. The joint deliberation over

In general, the long-term effects-particularly for girls-seem to be more harmful than had
been previously believed. See Judith S. Wallerstein, Childrenof Divorce: PreliminaryReport
of a Ten-Year Follow-up of Older Children and Adolescents, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 545 (1985). Some girls may seem to have adjusted well after divorce and only
show the harmful effects as they reach adulthood and contemplate serious relationships
themselves. See Judith S. Wallerstein, ChildrenAfter Divorce: Wounds That Don't Heal,N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 19.
69. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-ExpressingParenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); see
also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1987).
70. This general principle is recogiized in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILy DISSOLUTION
§ 2.09(1)(f), at 104 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996).
71. See generally McCant, supranote 21; Goldberg, supra note 21.
72. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise,1996 UTAH L. REV. 393.
73. See Ira C. Lupu, The Separation ofPowers andthe Protectionof Children, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1317 (1994).
74. See DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER (1996). See generally Marion F.
Ehrenberg et al., Shared ParentingAgreements After Marital Separation: The Roles of
Empathy andNarcissism, 64 J. CONSULTING &CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 808 (1996).
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the child's future might also reduce the level of acrimony, even from the start.75
This also will ease the pain of divorce for children.
We do not suggest that joint custody is a panacea. As we have noted, unfit
parents should be denied joint custody. Joint custody may also require parents
to cooperate with an ex-spouse to whom they feel bitter. As well, the custody
arrangements will have to be redrawn when one parent decides to move away.
However, we suggest that the promise of joint custody may reduce the number
of unfit fathers under bonding theories. Family bonding before marriage may also
reduce parental bickering and the probability of a move after a divorce.
C. Benefits After Divorce: Monitoring Theories

Even ifjoint custody does not affect physical custody, it might still serve as a
useful monitoring device to reduce agency costs between the parties. Agency
costs describe the costs of anticipated misbehavior by agents to their principals.
As used by economists, the definition of principal and agent is broader than that
used by lawyers. For economists, agency refers to any consensual relationship
among two or more parties in which one, the principal, implicitly confers
authority on the second, the agent, whose decisions may confer benefits or
impose costs on the principal.76
Agency-cost theories may easily be extended to family law!' The choice
between joint ownership and community of property in marriage is in part a
choice between two different responses to an agency-cost problem. Granting one
spouse the right to bind the other on the sale of matrimonial assets may
economize on the transaction costs of negotiating the sale, but the interspousal
grant of authority will also impose agency costs: some spouses will
improvidently agree to property transfers which the other spouse would wisely
have vetoed.
Agency costs may also arise in child rearing, both in marriage and after
divorce. In marriage, both parties will implicitly agree to a sharing or division of
parental responsibilities. It is costly to require a parental conference before every
minor child-rearing decision. Some decisions would never be made, and the child
would learn to play one parent against the other. On more important decisions,
however, the parents must balance these costs against the agency costs of
unilateral decisions by one parent alone.

75. Section 3020 of the CaliforniaFamily Code states that custody laws should assure
minor children of "frequent and continuing contact with both parents" after divorce, and
"encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this
policy." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DiSSOLUTION § 2.09 cmt. f, at 122-23.
76. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship: Its Economic

Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Stephen A. Ross, The
Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC.

134 (1973).
77. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REv. 2401
(1995).
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Divorce does not end, but instead exacerbates the agency-cost problem. Under
sole custody, the noncustodial parent is asked to delegate exclusive child-rearing
authority to the custodial parent at the same time that he is required to support
the child. If the noncustodial parent has been found unfit to raise the child, this
is just as it should be. But if the custody award is not an adverse comment on
parenting abilities, the agency-cost problem is more pressing.
The noncustodial parent may be seen as a principal, and the custodial parent
as an agent. The noncustodial parent will make child-support payments, but will
not easily be able to monitor how the money is spent. He might simply disagree
with the custodial parent's child-rearing decisions. Alternatively, he might worry
that the custodial parent will shirk her duties or-worse still-misappropriate the
funds.7" The noncustodial parent would want to condition support payments on
child expenditures.7 9 But because he cannot verify actual expenditures on the
child, this will prove unworkable. 0 The noncustodial parent may react to the
monitoring problem by cutting his support payments, to the child's detriment."'
In other contexts, such as corporate law, the agency-cost problem may be more
easily addressed through governance and liability strategies. For example, the
misbehaving manager might have to account to a board of monitoring directors,
or might be held liable civilly. However, these strategies are ordinarily not
apposite in the family-law context.82 Absent egregious misbehavior, civil liability
for misbehavior by either party would be apt to hurt the child. For example,
cutting off visitation rights to a parent who missed support payments might
deprive the child of the benefits of contact with the absent parent. Similarly, the
noncustodial parent cannot prevent the custodial parent from spending money for
her personal benefit.8 3 Moreover, if courts intervened over minor breaches, the
parties might use the threat of litigation strategically. The atmosphere would be
poisoned, and the benefits of joint deliberation over their child would be lost.84

78. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Bimbaum, 212 N.E.2d 37 (N.Y. 1965).
79. See Weiss & Willis, supranote 37, at 279.
80. See, e.g., Andrea H. Belier & John W. Graham, Child Support Payments: Evidence
from RepeatedCross Sections, 78 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS &PRoc. 81 (1988).
81. See Seltzer, Legal Custody,supra note 32, at 915.
82. See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20
RUTGERs L.J. 619 (1989). However, the court may provide noncontractual sanctions for
parental misbehavior, such as incarceration for contempt and occasionally a change in the
custody order. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Michie 1995).
83. Cf Rosenblatt, 212 N.E.2d at 40 (stating in dicta that diversion of funds will not end
support obligations).
84. Courts are also reluctant to permit bargaining between the spouses over child rearing
after a custody award.
An attempt by a parent ... to condition payment of child support upon an aspect
of the parenting plan .... or to hinder the performance by the other parent of
duties provided in the parenting plan, shall be deemed bad faith and shall be
punished.., by holding the [parent] in contempt of court....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.160(1) (West 1997). Compare Czapanskiy, supra note 82,
(arguing for support and visitation to be linked in a positive way through dual parenting and
responsibility), with Jessica Pearson & Jean Anhalt, Examiningthe Connection Between Child
Access and ChildSupport, 32 FAM. &CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 93 (1994) (noting the linkage
between support and visitation issues and arguing for a holistic resolution of both issues).
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It is a mistake to assume that the interests of the child and the custodial parent
must perfectly correspond. After an acrimonious divorce, the custodial parent
may want emotional distance from the noncustodial parent, and may even want
to hurt him. 5 "However much parents may love and care for their children,...
their own quite valid interests in distancing themselves from former spouses may
conflict with a child's interests in sustaining relationships with both parents or
other loved ones." 86 This in turn may lead to a request for lower child support to
minimize interference with the divorced family. If there is less visitation by a fit
parent, both the noncustodial parent and the child lose. 7 The custodial parent
may even reduce demands for financial support in exchange for reduced
visitation time from her ex-spouse 8
In a bitter divorce, the custodial parent might seek to turn the children against
the noncustodial parent, and this may impose financial as well as emotional costs
on them. The child who rejects the noncustodial parent is less likely to receive
his financial support, and courts might even agree to relax support duties in such
9
8

cases.

We suggest that joint-custody awards might usefully address these agency-cost
concerns. More frequent and prolonged contact with the children allows parents
to participate in day-to-day decisions involving the children's welfare ° Thus
joint custody facilitates monitoring strategies which permit both parents to
oversee the child-rearing decisions- the other makes. With joint custody,
therefore, we would expect child-support payments to be given more readily. In
the next Part we report on an empirical test which supports the monitoring

"Except as provided in an agreed plan that has been ordered by the court, it is not a defense to
an action under this section by one party that the other party failed to meet obligations under
a parenting plan or child support order." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §
2.22(3), at 365 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996); see also id. § 2.22 cmt. d, at 369.
85. The desire for personal autonomy may also be a problem if the noncustodial parent
wants to leave the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel.Mickey v. Mickey, 280 A.2d
417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Thomas v. Thomas, 335 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1960); Fritschler v.
Fritschler, 208 N.W.2d 336 (Wis. 1973).
86. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children'sPerspectives

and the Law, 36 ARIZ.L. REv. 11, 71 (1994).
87. See, e.g., Radford v. Matczuk, 164 A.2d 904 (Md. 1960); Block v. Block, 112 N.W.2d
923 (Wis. 1961); WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 68, at 234-40, 302; Czapanskiy,
supranote 82, at 636-37; Hetherington et al., supra note 61; Dee Wagner Phelps, Comment,
Child Support v. Rights to Visitation: Equity, Economics and the Rights of the Child, 16
STETSON L. REv. 139 (1986); Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Note, Making ParentsBehave: The
ConditioningofChildSupport and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1984).
88. See, e.g., Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 32, at 290.
89. See, e.g., Bethune v. Bethune, 399 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd, 414
N.Y.S.2d 905 (1979); cf Oeler by Gross v. Oeler, 594 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1991) (relieving custodial
parent of the obligation to support a minor child who unilaterally chooses to reside in her own
apartment). "Where a child leaves his parent's house voluntarily... to avoid the discipline and
restraint so necessary for the due regulation of families, he carries with him no credit; and the
parent is under no obligation to pay for his support." Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. (1 Tyng)
28, 31 (1819).
90. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION introductory discussion, at 10-11
(Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996).
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hypothesis. These results are consistent with an earlier finding by Maccoby and
Mnookin that joint-custody awards are positively and significantly correlated
with increased child-support payments. 9'
IV. AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This Part discusses the results of empirical tests of the bonding and monitoring
hypotheses described in the previous Part. We first examined the determinants
of divorce levels, and then the determinants of child-support ratios, using statelevel data from 1980 through 1991. A joint-custody variable is a significant and
negative predictor of divorce and a significant and positive predictor of support
payments. These findings are consistent with the bonding and monitoring
theories we describe above.
A. Bonding and Divorce

This Part describes a test of bonding explanations of joint custody. Otr
dependent variable DIVORCE is the per capita state divorce rate. To examine the
effect of state joint-custody laws on DIVORCE levels in State i, we estimated the
following reduced-form equation:
In DIVORCE, =

Ab

+ A31
JOINT,,+ 62 In UNEMPLOYMENT,,-, + / 3 In
METRO,_1 + A34
In WORKING WOMEN,,. + A3In ENTRY,
+ /36 In YEAR +e

where the variables are defined as provided in Table II, and where
In

A...6

= natural logarithm
= regression coefficients

e

= residual

i

= 1, 2, ....

t

= 1, 2,..., 12 index for years from 1980-91.

, 47

index for U.S. states

Divorce levels from 1980 through 1991 were regressed on 1979 through 1990
independent variables. Summary statistics are given in Table III. Unless
otherwise mentioned, the source for our data is the Statistical Abstract of the
UnitedStates.

All nondummy variables were transformed into their natural logarithmic form,
after we determined that this was appropriate through a Box-Cox test on
untransformed variables. 92

91. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 32, at 275.
92. Our Box-Cox Xs for the equations in Tables III and IV were 0.04 for the cross-sectional
model. Box-Cox transformations are discussed in GEORGE G. JUDGE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO
THETEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECONOMEmCS § 12.5, at 555-57 (2d ed. 1988). All statistical
analysis was performed using the computer program SHAZAM ©. See Kenneth J. White,
SHAZAM: A Comprehensive Computer Program for Regression Models (Version 7),
COMPUTATIONAL STAT.

&DATA ANALYSIS, Dec. 1992.
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TABLE II. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

Variable Name

Description

DIVORCE

Divorces divided by 1000 population

JOINT

1 = State promotes joint-custody award; 0
otherwise
Percent of cases in which joint custody is
awarded
Average of monthly unemployment figures* 100

JOINTCASE
UNEM
METRO
WORKING WOMEN

ENTRY

YEAR

Percent of population living in metropolitan
areas* 100
Number of women ages 18 and above employed,
over the total number of adult women in the
population
Year of admittance of state into the Union less
1788 (original states as 1) (excluding Alaska and
Hawaii)
1980-91 in Table III-V; 1986 to 1994 in Table
VII

SUPPORT

Number of cases in which non-AFDC collection
was received, divided by number of orders for
which non-AFDC support was owed

ADMIN

Total administrative expenses in non-AFDC
cases, divided by population

ADMINEFF

Total child-support dollars collected per
administrative dollar expended in collection, nonAFDC cases

SOURCES: Source for JOINT: various state statutes, cross-checked with
Marriageand Divorce in the United States, published in the winter issue of the
Family Law Quarterly,various years. Source for JOINTCASE: National Center
for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, data for 1990 and
1991; more recent data obtained from phone calls to various state agencies.
Source for WORKING WOMEN: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, printouts for various years. Source for all other data: Statistical
Abstract ofthe United States (various years).
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TABLE III. SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable Name

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

DIVORCE

4.9874

1.2834

2.2

9.1

DIVORCE (JointCustody States,
N=332)

4.7127

1.1544

2.2000

9.1000

DIVORCE (States
Without Joint
Custody, N=256)

5.4320

1.3879

2.9000

8.8000

JOINTCASE

0.20216

0.12795

0.041274

0.53509

UNEM -

6.8016

2.3134

2.2

18

METRO -

62.539

22.464

15

100

WORKING WOMEN

53.675

6.1561

36.6

64.65

SUPPORT

43.289

23.203

1.6453

100.00

ADMIN

20102000

44830000

481.10

39890000

ADMINEFF

2.9190

11.098

.050000

182.00

t-1

1. Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, DIVORCE, represents total state divorces per year
divided by state population. This is not the only way to measure divorce levels.
Divorces might also be computed per married couple. Per capita divorce rates
may be low because marriage rates are low, and not because married people are
more faithful or happier in that state. The divorce rate will be zero in a state
where no one marries. As a result, we re-estimated divorce levels on a permarried-couple basis. Because these results were very similar to the per capita
figures, however, we omit them. 93
Divorce rates are far higher in Nevada than in other states.94 We therefore
excluded Nevada observations from our study. We were left with forty-seven
continental U.S. states, over a twelve-year period, for a total of 564 observations.

93. The table is available from the authors. We preferred to estimate per capita divorce
levels because we lacked data for the number of married people in each state for all years
except the census years of 1980 and 1990. Our estimates of divorce levels per married couple
are therefore based on a construct for the intervening years.
94. During the period from 1973 through 1991, Nevada's average annual divorce rate was
15.47 per 1000, about three times higher than the mean of 5.08 when Nevada was excluded.
The next highest rate was approximately 8. We also eliminated Alaska and Hawaii data because
we employed an ENTRY variable.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:393

2. Independent Variables
Our JOINT predictor is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the
state promotes joint custody on divorce, and zero otherwise. Because we
expected lower divorce levels in joint-custody states, our model predicted that
the JOINT coefficients would be negative. States were given the value of one
whenever their statutes mentioned joint custody as a preference or an alternative,
or when language in the statute encouraged each parent to spend significant time
with the child. Where the statutory language was ambiguous, or where courts
treated it as such, we looked to court decisions in categorizing the states.
The JOINT variable should be seen as a proxy for the actual custody
dispositions made at divorce. Ultimately, what counts is the way courts decide
custody in a state, and not the statutory regime. For example, a judge in a state
which promotes joint custody might decide to award it in only the narrowest of
circumstances. Our JOINT variable might thus be prone to Type I errors (with
courts frowning on joint custody in the face of a statutory presumption) and Type
II errors (with courts promoting joint custody without statutory
encouragement).95

Because of this, we sought to find out to what extent courts actually awarded
joint custody. While such data is hard to come by, we were able to determine the
percent ofjoint-custody awards for nineteen states for various recent years, for

a total of sixty-nine observations.96 This. variable, JOINTCASE, we employed in
Table VI to estimate divorce levels.
97
UNEMPLOYMENT, the yearly average of monthly unemployment rates, is
our proxy for economic conditions. We would expect to find higher divorce rates
after economic downturns," as economic hardship imposes strains on marriages.
A spouse might have to work harder, spending more time away from his family,
possibly even migrating to another state. In addition, where the parties have seen
their wealth disappear in a severe economic downturn, the financial costs of a

95. We recognize, of course, that most custody decisions are reached by agreement between
the parents and merely ratified by the judge presiding over their divorce. Nonetheless, the legal
regime in place during the negotiations will have an effect on the parties' expectations during
marriage. Additionally, it will set the endpoints for their bargaining on divorce. See generally
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 27 (discussing how legal systems affect negotiations
outside the courtroom).
96. To reach these numbers we relied upon a May, 1996 release of data prepared and
published by the National Center for Health Statistics ("NCHS"), a subdivision of the National
Center for Disease Control. The NCHS compiles data from the vital statistics departments of
various states.
97. This is the percent of members of the labor force who are actively looking for
employment.
98. See Gary S. Becker et al., An EconomicAnalysis ofMaritalInstability, 85 J.POL. ECON.
1141, 1156 (1977) (explaining how greater deviations between actual and expected earnings
increase the probability of divorce).
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divorce might seem less troubling.9 9 If one has lost nearly everything, there
comes a point when there is less need to preserve what one has by staying
married.
To reflect differences in social norms, we employed three social predictors:
METRO, WORKING WOMEN, and ENTRY. Many more people divorce today
than during the Great Depression. Divorce rates would therefore appear more
sensitive to social norms than to economic factors. Increased divorce rates over
the last thirty years may thus reflect a decline in social stigma, which reduced the
cost of what used to be seen as deviant behavior.'00
Urbanization has always been linked with increased divorce rates.' Cities
offer greater opportunities to stray, and anonymity for transgressors. In cities,
moreover, the safety net of community and religion might be weaker than in
smaller towns. No doubt, that has always been part of the appeal of cities.
METRO is our proxy for urbanization, and represents the percent of the
population living in a metropolitan statistical area.
Our WORKING WOMEN variable represents the percent of working-age
women with regular labor-force employment.0 2 If working wives are more
valuable to their husbands, we would expect them to be less likely to divorce. 3
Regional differences in divorce rates are long-standing.' ° The frontier offered
spouses a relatively easy exit option from marriage,' °5 and de Toqueville noted
the "restless spirit" and "extreme love of independence" of Americans, whose
westward migration "broke the ties of attachment."' 6 Even today, higher divorce
rates in Western states plausibly reflect a more mobile society, with a greater
proportion of migrants and weaker ties to the social and family institutions which
prop up ailing marriages. Regional differences in divorce rates might also reflect
different social sanctions for divorce.

99. See Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Impact of Family Background and Early Marital
Factors on MaritalDisruption, 12 J. FAM. ISSUES 22 (1991) (reporting a two-thirds greater
probability of divorce if the husband was unemployed at any time during the first year of
marriage).
100. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 12. Other studies have linked the no-fault movement
to the percent of women in the labor force. See Douglas W. Allen, No-Fault Divorce in
Canada:Its Cause and Effect, 36 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming Summer 1998).
101. See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER 271-72, 376-77 (1988).
102. For these data, we relied upon printouts of relevant statistics annually compiled,
prepared, and distributed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a subdivision of the U.S.
Department of Labor. The percent of adult working women had to be estimated for 1991 and
1992, since the over-18 population was unavailable.
103. See Allen Parkman, Why.Are MarriedWomen Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. (forthcoming Mar. 1998).
104. In 1908 the Labor Department reported that "the divorce rate increases as one goes
westward." I U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR& COMMERCE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906, at 14
(2d ed. 1978). On current regional trends, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market
for Deadbeats,25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 201, 217-22 (1996).
105. See PHILLIPS, supra note 101, at 452.
106. ALEXIS DETOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261-62 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer
eds. & George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
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One might seek to capture the frontier effect through regional dummy
variables. However, dummy variables do not weigh the frontier effect, as the
ENTRY variable does. ENTRY represents the number of years between 1788 and
the year the state was admitted to the Union, 1 7 with generally increasing values
as one moves westward.
3. Methodology
Our model estimates average filing rates at the state level through state-level
time-series cross-sectional ("TSCS") data. While divorce is an individual
decision, divorce levels also respond to societal pressures, and societies have
their own character, for better or worse.
The use of TSCS data heightens concerns about idiosyncratic state factors not
captured by the other variables. Because of this, we employed a fixed-effects
model, with a separate intercept v, for each state,'0 8 as well as a cross-sectioned
model without separate state dummy variables.
We first estimated divorce levels through-an Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS")
regression which employed a lagged dependent variable. However, a Lagrange
multiplier test revealed a substantial serial correlation problem. In theory, one
might address this through instrumental variables, but in practice it is difficult
to find instruments which are well correlated with the dependent variable and are
uncorrelated with the errors. Because of this, we employed the Kmenta crosssectionally heteroskedastistic and timewise autocorrelated ("CHTA") model with
fixed-state effects. 0 9
The CHTA model assumes cross-sectional independence and 8Ocoefficients
which do not vary between cross-sections. However, we adjusted for crosssectional differences through our fixed-state-effects model, and through the
state-specific generalized least-squares technique of the CHTA model. Under a
CHTA regression, the equation is first estimated by OLS. Next, the OLS
residuals are used to estimate a separate coefficient of autocorrelation p
(bounded by -I and +1) for each state i. The p's are then used to transform the
observations to produce a serially independent and homoskedastistic error term.
yn= p Xit,/ + v,+ e,
Finally, the equation is estimated by the OLS method.
We suggest above that our WORKING WOMEN variable is a useful predictor
of divorce rates, with husbands less likely to divorce working wives who are

107. The ENTRY variable took the value of one for each of the original 13 states. A
comparable entry variable was used to predict state economic growth in MANCUR OLSON, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 100 (1982).
108. See generally JUDGEET AL., supra note 92,

§ 11.4, at 468-79 (discussing pooling timeseries and cross-sectional data using dummy variables). On the need to employ a fixed-stateeffect model for time-series, cross-sectional data, see Gary S. Becker, Comments on Danzon,
Maki,Murray,andAllen, 11 J. LAB. ECON. S326 (1993).
109. On CHTA estimation, see JAN KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 618-22 (2d ed.
1986).
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contributing substantially to household income. However, causation may work
the other way. When divorce is more likely, the insurance function of marriage
is weakened, and wives have greater reason to seek remunerative employment."'
Further, after divorce many homemakers enter the labor force. The variable may
thus be regarded as endogenous, and we therefore estimated divorce rates
through a Two-Stage Least Squares ("2SLS") procedure in which divorce and
WORKING WOMEN rates are jointly estimated."'
4. Results
Our results are reported in Tables IV-VI. Our principal result is that divorce
levels are negatively and significantly correlated throughout with joint-custody
laws. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that joint-custody laws
reduce divorce levels.
Table IV reports on a regression of DIVORCE rates on legal, economic, and
social state-level variables. Specifications one and two employ a CHTA model,
while specifications three and four employ a 2SLS model in which the
WORKING WOMEN variable is treated as endogenous. In specifications one
and three we report on a fixed-effects model, and in specifications two and four
we report on a cross-sectioned model. A Hausman test permits us to reject the
null hypothesis that fixed-state effects are independent of the explanatory
variables in the cross-sectioned specifications, suggesting that the equation is
more properly modeled with fixed effects.

110. See Parkman, supra note 103.
111. The exogenous variables included UNEM and CONAD, the per capita value of
construction starts, adjusted for inflation.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVORCE

Dependent Variable: DIVORCE
Legal Variable: JOINT
Kmenta Pooling and 2SLS Estimations
Kmenta
Pooling
Fixed Effects

Kmenta
Pooling
Crosssectioned

2SLS
Fixed
Effects

2SLS
Crosssectioned

JOINT I

-0.036257
(-2.780)**

-0.043044
(-4.657)**

-0.034085
(-2.593)**

4. 11674
(-5.351)**

In UNEM W

-0.051505
(-4.020)**

-0.022952
(-2.217)**

In METRO,,

-0.014873
(-0.2897)

-0.030602
(-1.953)**

0.0064090
(0.1244)

-0.025098
(-1.076)

In
0.48243
WORKING
(7.720)**
WOMEN W-_

-0.040438
(-0.6848)

0.41867
(6.868)**

0.39147
(0.9317)

In ENTRYI

0.063464
(12.27)**
-0.020202
(-1.856)*

0.038263
(0.8300)
-0.096459

(-11.49)**

0.058235
(9.977)**
-0.069658
(-1.284)

0.081286

0.13575
(0.08496)
0.23042

3.3830

29.627

0.023961
(0.5226)

In YEARI
CONSTANT
Standard
Error

0.080591

1.7846
(7.828)**
0.64472

SSE

3.3189

231.53

Buse R2

0.9043

0.2974

R2 (adj.)

1

1_1
10.9027

0.2178

NOTES: Number = 564. In the 2SLS estimations, WORKING WOMEN is
treated as an endogenous variable, and UNEM, CONSTRUCT, and state dummy
variables are employed as exogenous variables. T-statistics are denoted with a
* * if significantly different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test), and with
a * at the 1 level.
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TABLE V. THE

DETERMINANTS OF DIVORCE

Dependent Variable: DIVORCE
Legal Variable: JOINT
Sensitivity Tests
OLS
Fixed Effects

OLS
Cross-sectioned

Least Absolute
Errors
Cross-sectioned

JOINT t1

-0.032022
(-2.481)**

-0.10844
(-5.238)**

-0.12299
(-5.081)**

In UNEM W

-0.044087
(-3.502)**

0.044967
(1.478)

0.074086
(2.083)**

In METRO W

0.076273
(1.662)

In WORKING
WOMEN ,

0.33991
(6.611)**

-0.030629
(-1.354)
-0.26394
(-2.078)**

-0.060884
(-2.302)**
0.034196
(0.2302)

In ENTRY

0.069112
(1.565)

0.052973
(9.723)**

.069926
(10.97)**

In YEAR

-0.092031
(-11.69)**

0.014620
(0.7000)

-0.020162
(-0.8255)

2.5501
(5.024)**

1.4701
(2.477)**

CONSTANT
Standard Error

0.79992E-01

0.22359

0.26147

SSE

3.2698

27.846

29.206

0.9057

0.2635

0.2623

171.219

15.183

_

195.342

1355.187

2

R (adj.)
B-P-G X
LM X

2

2

NOTES: Number = 564. T-statistics are denoted with a ** if significantly
different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test), and with a * at the .1 level.
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TABLE VI. THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVORCE

Dependent Variable: DIVORCE
Legal Variable: JOINTCASE
2SLS Estimation
2SLS
Fixed Effects
JOINTCASE W

-1.8800
(-2.216)**

METRO ,

-0.73940E-02 (-2.427)**

WORKING
WOMEN tENTRY
YEAR

-0.080002 (-2.596)**

Standard Error

0.8065

SSE
R 2 (adj.)

44.88
0.3331

0.88060E-02 (3.737)**
0.50361E-02 (5.447)**

NOTES: Number = 69. WORKING WOMEN is treated as an endogenous
variable, and UNEM, CONSTRUCT, and state dummy variables are employed
as exogenous variables. T-statistics are denoted with a ** if significantly
different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test), and with a * at the .1 level.
The JOINT coefficient is significant and negative in all Table IV
specifications, and also in Table V's sensitivity tests. A change to joint-custody
laws is associated with a two- to eleven-percent reduction in divorce levels. This
is a small but substantial gain; a larger one would have been suspicious.
Table VI reports on an estimation of divorce levels in which we substitute the
JOINTCASE predictor for the JOINT dummy variable. When the legal variable
measures actual case dispositions, with a limited number of observations, we still
found that the legal coefficient is negative and significant."'
B. Monitoring and Child Support
In the regressions reported in Table VII, we tested the monitoring hypothesis
that the move to joint custody will be associated with higher child-support
payments. Our dependent variable, SUPPORT, measures the extent to which
child-support payments are made, and is defined as the number of orders for
current support where a collection was received divided by the number of orders

112. We also regressed child-abuse and child-support enforcement figures on the
independent variables of our model. In neither case was the joint-custody coefficient
significant, though the signs were as our bonding theory would have predicted.
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for current support where a collection was due. "3 We chose this measure rather
than one keyed to actual collections for two reasons. First, many support
payments are made voluntarily, and thus never show up in actual collections data.
We would be undercounting support payments, with no way to know whether the
tendency to pay voluntarily varies uniformly among states. Second, monetary
sums do not account for differences in the cost of living among states.
1. Model
We estimated SUPPORT levels through an equation of the form:
SUPPORT,

=

8 + /61 JOINT,, + 82 UNEMPLOYMENT,, + 8,
WORKING WOMEN,,4j +/3 ENTRY, + A ADMIN. + j6
ADMINEFF,,., + e,

where the variables are defined as provided in Table II, and where
30...6

= Regression coefficients

e

= Residual
= 1, 2, ...
= 1, 2, ...

i

t

,
,

47 index for continental U.S. states
9 index for years from 1986-94.

We employed two new independent variables to measure the extent to which
states enforced support obligations and penalized deadbeats. When states do not
fund child-support enforcement agencies, less support is collected, regardless of
individual parental preferences."' Our ADMIN variable represents the state's
total per capita expenditures for non-AFDC cases for each year."' It is not
enough to look at welfare budgets, however, as welfare spending might
wastefully fund a bloated bureaucracy." 6 We therefore employed an ADMINEFF
predictor to measure the efficiency of welfare bureaucracies. ADMINEFF is

113. This data is collected annually by the Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of Child Support Enforcement. For example, in 1992, these amounts were reflected in Tables
74 and 75. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &HUMAN
SERVS., 17TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 141-42 (1992). In each year, the non-AFDC

numbers were used.
114. This is well documented by a classic study. See DAVID L. CHAMBERS,
PAY 71-162 (1979).

MAKING FATHERS

& HUMAN
(various years). For fiscal year 1992, we used Table
26. In AFDC cases, the state is the moving party because it has already provided welfare for
the child. The noncustodial parent who is ordered to pay support knows that, if he complies,
the child will not receive the money.
116. For example, in 1992, Michigan was able to collect $6.53 for every administrative
dollar in non-AFDC cases. On the other hand, Rhode Island only collected $1.06 during the
same year. See OFFICEOF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 113, at 76.
115. See

OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
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defined as child-support collections per dollar of total administrative
expenditures." 7
Our SUPPORT data was taken from 1986 through 1994, with our independent
variables spanning 1985 through 1993. Because of missing child-support data,
we were left with 267 observations. Since we had an uneven number of
observations in each state, we were unable to use Kmenta pooling, as we had in
our previous tables. This explains why we employed an OLS estimation
technique. Differences in the data set also explain why we were unable to employ
our JOINTCASE predictor in Table VII. A Box-Cox estimate of SUPPORT
suggested that the data should not be transformed into logarithmic form." 8
TABLE

VII. THE

DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT

Dependent Variable: SUPPORT
Legal Variable: JOINT
OLS and 2SLS Estimations
OLS
Fixed
Effects

OLS
Crosssectioned

2SLS
Fixed Effects

2SLS
Crosssectioned

JOINT W

10.371
(2.096)**

0.64344
(0.2016)

9.9555
(3.722)**

1.1298
(0.3520)

UNEM t-

0.99324
(1.248)

WORKING
WOMEN,,
ENTRY t-

0.46764
(8.257)**
0.014154
(0.1565)
1.5882
(5.176)**
-0.026435
(-0.1877)

-0.83042
(-1.111)
0.40270
(7.347)**
-0.019122
(-0.6731)
1.5351
(5.454)**
-0.0096842
(-0.08196)

0.63785
(13.87)**
0.028688
(1.028)
2.1971
(7.998)**
0.000076473
(0.0006177)

0.48565
(7.826)**
-0.019244
(-0.6748)
1.7228
(5.918)**
-0.028759
(-0.2435)

Standard
Error
SSE

21.757

27.970
(4.371)**
21.127

22.272

18.636
(4.176)**
21.224

102720

116060

129960

117570

R 2 (adj.)

0.1207

0.1709

0.0786

0.1633

ADMIN
ADMINEFF
CONSTANT

117. This is for non-AFDC cases only. See sources cited supra note 115. For fiscal year

1992, we used Table 9. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supranote 113, at tbl.9.
118. The Box-Cox X was 0.69. See generally JUDGE ET AL., supra note 92.
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NOTES: Number = 267. In the 2SLS estimations, WORKING WOMEN is
treated as an endogenous variable, and METRO, UNEM, CONSRUCT, and state
dummy variables are employed as exogenous variables. T-statistics are denoted
with a * * if significantly different from zero at the .05 level (two-tailed test), and
with a * at the. 1 level.
Once again, we treat WORKING WOMEN as an endogenous variable in Table
VII's 2SLS estimation. If less child support is paid, more women will seek
outside jobs. At the same time, labor-force participation might increase the
ability of women to pursue deadbeat noncustodial fathers. Working women are
also less likely to be relying on public assistance, with its incentives against
collection.
2. Results
Our results are reported in Table VII. The JOINT coefficient is positive in all
specifications, and is significant in the crucial fixed-effects equations. A
Hausman test indicates that the equation is better specified as a fixed-effects
model, and our results therefore support the monitoring hypothesis of joilnt
custody.
Unsurprisingly, the ADMIN coefficient was consistently positive and
significant, as was the WORKING WOMEN coefficient.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article suggests two ways in which a joint-custody regime might help
children. Under bonding theories, a spouse who would expect to lose custody
under a sole-custody regime has greater incentives to bond with his family under
joint custody. With greater family bonding, the likelihood of a divorce declines.
This would greatly benefit children, for whom a divorce is devastating. Under
monitoring theories, joint custody usefully polices the agency costs of
misbehavior by a spouse who has been granted sole custody. The noncustodial
spouse has thus a greater incentive to support his child on a move to joint
custody.
We tested the bonding and monitoring hypotheses through an econometric
analysis of the determinants of divorce. A joint-custody dummy variable was
significantly and negatively correlated with divorce rates. So too was a variable
based on the percent of joint-custody awards with a smaller number of
observations. These results are consistent with the bonding explanation ofjoint
custody. Our joint-custody dummy variable was also significantly and positively
correlated with child-support ratios, as predicted by monitoring theories.
This is not to say that joint-custody awards are always appropriate. Awarding
joint custody to a violent and abusive parent may harm children, and sole custody
is obviously preferable in such cases. In addition, it is possible that some women
might prefer to remain in abusive marriages rather than assume the risk ofjoint
custody. Alternatively, they might trade off material assets against custody at
property settlement. This suggests a need for more research on child abuse and
wealth transfers on a move to joint custody.
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APPENDIX

The following models the welfare effects of a change in legal regime from sole
maternal to joint custody. For the purpose of the model, we make certain
simplifying assumptions.
We assume that marriage rates are exogenously determined, and do not depend
on the specification of custody rights at law. Custody laws are of two kinds only.
Under sole custody, full custody and responsibility for the child is awarded
solely to the wife, unless the parties bargain for joint custody at the time of
divorce; under joint custody, physical care of and responsibility for the children
is shared. The spouses might have different preferences as to custody, and their
preferences might not correspond to the legal regime. At marriage, therefore,
they might seek to enter into private agreements as to custody. We assume that
these bargains are costlessly written and legally enforceable at divorce.
The parties have full and costless information about asset values, probabilities
as to the occurrence of events, and each other's preferences, and form unbiased
estimates of expected values. They are both risk neutral. At marriage, all of their
assets become jointly owned, and continue to be so until divorce. Asset-transfer
agreements between the parties during marriage are unenforceable, and the
parties lack access to credit markets.
The parties marry at time t. In the next period, at time t1, they must decide
whether they will divorce, and if so whether they will enter into a private custody
agreement.
I. BARGAINING OVER CUSTODY IN A SOLE MATERNALCUSTODY REGIME

We first assume that the legal regime is one of sole custody and examine the
gains from private agreements at t, to elect joint custody.
Let
KH.I =

Psychic costs born by husband on the loss of his children under
sole maternal custody, less the psychic costs he would bear under
joint custody

K,., =

Psychic costs born by wife on the loss of her children under joint
custody, less the psychic costs she would bear under sole maternal
custody

JC1 =

Price the parties will agree to in a private agreement to opt from
sole maternal to joint custody, (KHI > JC1 2 Kw.1 )

AH ,=

Husband's assets immediately after divorce but before side
bargains for custody rights.

JOINT CUSTODY
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Under sole maternal custody, ajoint-custody agreement provides the husband
with a gain of K,, - JC, and the wife a gain of JC1 - Kw.1, and such agreement
will be reached provided that (1) At, : JC1, and (2) KHl - Kw.1 > 0.
We next examine the custody bargain from the perspective of the parties at
marriage. Define KH.O, Kw., JC, and AIO as the expected values of KH.I, KwI,
JC,, and Ali, respectively, at to. Let
PDsC,O =

PH.O

Probability of divorce at to under presumptive sole custody on the
assumption that the parties will enter into all privately optimal
custody bargains at t,

= Probability at to that AH,I

JC1.

At to under presumptive sole custody, the expected value to the husband of the
custody agreement is
PD.SC,. PH.0 (KHO- JCo).

For the wife, the expected value of the custody agreement is
PD,SC.O P ,0

II.

(JC0 - Kw,),

EFFECT OF A SHIFT TO A JOINT-CUSTODY LEGAL
REGIME

Assume next that the custody law changes from presumptive sole to
presumptive joint custody. In this Part we consider the wealth effects of the
change, on the assumption that the probability of divorce is unaffected by the
shift in the presumptive legal rule. In the next Part we abandon this assumption.
Let
SC, =

Price the parties will agree to in an agreement to elect from joint
to sole maternal custody, (Kw,,; SC1 k Kit)

Aw., =

Wife's assets immediately after divorce but before side bargains
for custody rights.

The wife's loss from the move to the new legal regime is her foregone loss of
the gains from the joint-custody bargain (JCI - Kwl) plus the personal cost of lost
custody. This is Kw,,, without a side bargain for sole maternal custody. With the
side bargain, her loss cannot exceed SC,.
Define SC o and Aw.o as the expected values of SC, and Aw.1 , respectively, at to;
and define
Pw.o =

Probability at to that Aw,

SC 1.

At to, the wife's loss on the change to a presumptive joint-custody legal regime
is
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[(1 - Pw,0)Kwo + Pw,0SCo + PHO(JCO- Kw.0)].

For the husband, the gain from the move to the new legal regime is the gain in
custody rights plus the gain from the sole-custody bargain. At to, this is
PD.SC.0[(1

- PHO)KH~o + PHOJCO +Pwo (SCo- KHO)].

Define
Lw,o =

(1 - Pw.o)Kwo+ PwoSC o + PH.o(JCO- Kw,).

Grto =

(1 - PHO)KH, o + PHOJCO +Pwo(SCo- KO).

and

The move from sole to joint custody will then be efficient, provided that GKo
Lwo, as it will be if KH'o > Kw,o.

>

III. SELF-BINDING GAINS
Under free bargaining, who gets custody will depend on the valuation the two
parties place on sole and joint custody. The locus of custody may also depend on
wealth endowments. Assume that KH, > KwJ, so that joint custody is privately
optimal. Under sole custody, however, 1he parties may be unable to reach an
agreement to elect joint custody because JC
AHI, with a probability of (1 PHO)"

The change from sole to joint custody will therefore increase the probability
that the husband will get joint custody. Suppose further that divorces are initiated
only by men, and that on marriage they would wish to bind themselves to their
spouses by waiving divorce rights were such waivers enforceable. As waivers are
not enforceable, however, the husband may seek other ways to bind himself to
the marriage.
Assume that at time to the husband expects that at t, he will seek a divorce if
either event A or event D has occurred. As to event A his preferences are time
consistent, but not as to event D. That is, at to he would wish to be divorced if
event A subsequently occurs; however, at to he would wish to waive the right to
a divorce if event D occurs.
Divorce rights cannot be waived. However, the husband can reduce the
probability that he will seek a divorce at t, through self-binding strategies
employed at to. Spending more time with his child before divorce might be one
such self-binding strategy. We assume that at to the husband expects to employ
all such self-binding strategies, and that he still expects that he will want a
divorce at t, if D has occurred. With the further promise of joint custody,
however, the husband will not seek a divorce t, if D has occurred. He will bond
more closely with his children, since the emotional cost of the divorce will be
lessened. Not only will the husband be more reluctant to seek a divorce at t1 , he
will also avoid those occasions prior to t, which might take him down the road
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to a subsequent divorce. Temptations to stray will be less tempting. As a result,
the probability of divorce will fall from PD,SC to PDJC*
It will then be seen that the move from sole to joint custody might be valueincreasing for the wife as well as the husband. The wife's loss on the change to
a presumptive joint-custody legal regime is PD sc.oLw*. However, these losses
might now be exceeded by the gains associated with a reduction in the
probability of divorce from PDsco to PDJC,.o Define Cw.0 as the expected value of
the emotional and financial costs to the wife of a divorce, excluding Kw.0 . For the
wife, then, the move to joint custody will result in gains of
(PDsc.o - PD.Jc
1 o)(Cw.o + Lwo).

Where either the difference between

PDSCO and PDICo is large, or where Cw,o is
large relative to Lw, the move to joint custody might leave everyone better off.
To see this, assume the following values:
PD.SC.O

0.5

Lw.o 10

PD.JC.0

0.3

Cw.
0 100.

The move to joint custody will impose the costs of Lwo or 10. But the reduction
in the probability of divorce will result in gains of 22, for a net gain to the wife
of 12.

